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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roy Johnson appeals from the district court's order granting Clarence Knight's motion
for restitution in the full amount of Knight's medical bills, without offset for the $100,000
settlement payment Knight received after he filed his restitution motion. Knight was the direct
victim of Mr. Johnson's aggravated DUI. Knight's motion was filed and litigated by Knight's
civil attorney, independently from the prosecuting attorney's office and the State, and after the
court-ordered restitution time had already expired.
In his restitution motion, Knight told the district court he was attempting to negotiate
with his medical providers to resolve his "outstanding medical bills"; that Mr. Johnson's
insurance carrier, Farm Bureau, had been "refusing to cooperate in this process forming the basis
for this motion." (R., p.63.) Knight's motion further stated that, because of Farm Bureau's
"refusal to cooperate in this case," a civil lawsuit might soon be filed. (R., p.63.) The week after
he filed his restitution motion, Knight received a $100,000 settlement payment from Farm
Bureau, released Mr. Johnson from all claims of any kind, and explicitly agreed to indemnify
Mr. Johnson and to hold him harmless for any "subrogation claims, medical liens, Medicare or
Medicaid claims." (R., p.129.)
However, Knight continued to litigate his restitution motion. He submitted all of his
medical bills, totaling $10 I ,665.64, and he insisted that the district court could not offset this
amount for the $100,000 payment he had just received. Mr. Johnson objected to the filing of the
motion on the grounds that Knight lacked standing and that the restitution period had already
expired. He also argued he was entitled to an offset in the amount of the $100,000 payment his
insurer had just paid to Knight for the medical expenses claimed. The district court overruled

Mr. Johnson's objections and entertained and granted Knight's motion in full, ordering that
Mr. Johnson pay $101,665.64 in restitution to Knight.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Johnson argued that the district court's restitution order
should be vacated because the district court exceeded its authority, or otherwise failed to comply
with applicable legal standards, in multiple ways. Mr. Johnson argued the district court lacked
jurisdiction or other authority to entertain and grant Knight's motion because neither Knight nor
his personal attorney had standing to file that motion. He also argued that the district court
exceeded its authority by granting Knight's untimely restitution request after the statutory
restitution period that was previously ordered had expired. Mr. Johnson further argued that, even
if the district court had the authority to grant an order of restitution, the court erred because: the
district court improperly refused to offset the restitution amount by the $100,000 settlement
payment already made to Knight; there was no evidence of "out-of-pocket" expenses paid, or to
be paid, by Knight and therefore no showing Knight "actually suffered" an economic loss; and
the district court's refusal to give effect to the parties' settlement agreement resulted in an
improper double payment and an unwarranted windfall to Knight.
This Reply Brief is necessary to: (1) clarify the record regarding the parties' respective
positions conceded or taken in the district court, and demonstrate that the prosecutor's
concession that Knight lacked standing to file his motion precludes that State's appellate
argument to the contrary; (2) demonstrate that Mr. Johnson's appellate arguments do not conflict
with, and therefore are not waived by, the positions he took below; and (3) address the State's
baseless appellate argument that, notwithstanding the absence of any such finding below, the
$100,000 insurance payment to Knight was allocated as compensation for Knight's
undocumented non-economic losses.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by ordering Mr. Johnson to pay $ 10 I ,665 .64 in restitution to Clarence
Knight?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Ordering Mr. Johnson To Pay $101,665.64 In Restitution To
Clarence Knight

l.

The State's Position Below Bars It From Arguing On Appeal That Knight And
His Civil Attorney Had Standing In This Case

In the district court, the State conceded that victims do not have standing to file or
petition the court for restitution independently from the prosecutor's office. (Tr., p.17, Ls.1016.)

That position is binding on the State in this appeal, and it precludes the State's current

appellate argument that Knight had standing to independently file a motion for restitution in a
case in which he is not a party. See State v. Cohagen, 162 Idaho 717, 722 (2017) (holding the
State, even as the respondent, is not permitted to argue a position on appeal after having
conceded that issue below).
In this case, the State did not request an order of restitution for Knight, nor did it present
any evidence to support such an order, and the statutory time for submitting the restitution
evidence - the 180-day period previously ordered by the court - had expired. (See Appellant's
Br., pp.13-14.) However, independent from the State and its prosecuting attorney, and after the
statutory period expired, Knight's civil attorney filed a restitution motion directly with the
district court. (R., p.62.) Although the prosecutor was present at the restitution hearing, she did
not join or concur in Knight's request, nor did she join or concur in Knight's proffer of reasons
for the delay, nor did the prosecutor otherwise agree that such delay was necessary. (See

generally Tr., p.17, L.10 - p.28, L.12.) Significantly, the prosecutor never asked the district
judge to modify his previous order for a 180-day restitution period. (See generally Tr., p.17,
L. 10 - p.28, L.12.)
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Instead, the State remained conspicuously silent on all of these issues, with one
significant exception: the issue of Knight's standing. In response to the district court's direct
question, "What's the State's position?" the prosecuting attorney answered:
Well, I think Mr. Gatewood [defense counsel] makes a good point. There is an
issue of standing as far as the victim being able to file or petition the Court for
their own restitution order separate and apart from anything done through the
prosecutor's office. I think if we're just addressing that point, then I think
Mr. Gatewood has a valid point.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.10-16.)
Having taken this position in answer to the district court's direct question, the State is
barred from taking a contrary position on appeal. State v. Cohagen, 162 Idaho 717, 722 (2017)
(holding that the State, even as the respondent, is not permitted to argue a position on appeal that
it conceded below). Thus, to the extent that the State now argues that Knight or his attorney had
standing 1 to file a motion, independent of the State's prosecuting attorney (see, e.g.,
Resp. Br., pp.8-14, 17-18), the State's arguments are barred by the position taken in the district
court.

2.

The District Court Lacked Authority To Consider A Non-Party's Evidence
Submitted After The Statutory Time Had Expired

Even if Knight had standing to file his restitution motion in a case in which he was not a
party, the district court had no authority - jurisdictional or statutory - to entertain a motion, or to
1

The State cites to State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 597 (2011) for the proposition that granting a
non-party's motion is not reversible error. (Resp. Br., p.9.) However, Draper confirms that
persons who are not parties to a criminal case Jack standing to file motions, and a district court
errs if it grants them. 151 Idaho at 597. Moreover, in Draper, the Court concluded that the
district court's granting the motion by a party who lacked standing to file the motion was not
reversible error, because the action taken on the motion - the exclusion of the defendant's
parents from a presentence interview - did not result in prejudice to the defendant. 151 Idaho at
597. In Mr. Johnson's case, however, the district court's granting of Knight's unauthorized
motion resulted in an order of $101,665 and plainly prejudiced Mr. Johnson.
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conduct evidentiary proceedings on a motion for restitution, due to the lateness of the motion. At
the time of sentencing, and on the motion of the State, the district found and ordered that a 180day restitution period was the reasonably necessary time. (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-22.) As Mr. Johnson
argued below and in his Appellant's Brief, that time period had already expired when Knight's
civil attorney filed his motion with new evidence and arguments requesting an order of
restitution. (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-16; Appellant's Br., p.14.) Thus, contrary to the State's assertion,
Knight's action was not simply a non-party's attempt to have a district court take action "where
the court already had the power to act." (See Resp. Br., p.9.) At the time Knight filed his
motion, the previously ordered 180-day restitution period had already expired, ending the district
court's statutory authority to order restitution. See State v. Keys, 160 Idaho 95, 98 (Ct. App.
2016) (holding that an order of restitution that does not comply with the statute's time limitation
represents and abuse of the district court's discretion1 and is invalid, requiring that the order be
vacated.) Thus, contrary to the State's assertion, Knight did not simply submit a request for the
court to take an action within its authority.

3.

Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) Does Not Grant Victims Permission To Submit
Evidence Of Loss To The District Court Independently From The Prosecuting
Attorney

Contrary to the State's appellate arguments (Resp.Br., pp. I 0, 16), the language in
I.C. § 19-5304(6) does not grant to victims a statutory right or permission to present evidence of
loss to the district court independently from the State and the prosecuting attorney. Subsection
LC. § 19-5304(6) reads:
Economic loss shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to
the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator. Each
party shall have the right to present such evidence as may be relevant to the issue
of restitution, and the court may consider such hearsay as may be contained in the
presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to the court.
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(Emphasis added.) The language relied on by the State - the first sentence - is actually a
limitation on the evidence upon which the district court may base its finding of economic loss,

but the statute goes on to make clear it is the parties who have "the right to present such
evidence." Knight was not a party and therefore he had no standing or statutory authority to file
motions or petition the court directly, independent of the prosecuting attorney and the State.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.l 0-16.)
Additionally, while the statute's language states that the court's order "shall be based" on
the evidence "submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence
investigator," nothing in that language authorizes the submission of such evidence outside of the
statutory time. See l.C. § 19-5304(6). As argued in the Appellant's Brief, at pages 12-13, the
holdings in State v. Keys, 160 Idaho 95, 98 (Ct. App. 2016), State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762
(Ct. App. 2010), and State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659,662 (Ct. App. 2002) dictate otherwise.
4.

Knight's Civil Attorney, Who Had No Authority To Participate In This Case.
Could Not Substitute For The State Prosecutor

As argued in the Appellant's Brief, at pages 11 - 12, Knight's civil attorney could not
legally act as the authorized representative of the State. See also l.C. § 31-2604(1) (placing duty
on the prosecutor to prosecute all motions, civil or criminal, where the State is a party). The
State's response on appeal, is that that Knight's attorney "merely assisted in the presentation of
evidence." (Resp.Br., p.13.) This argument grossly distorts the record, particularly since no
party with standing or other statutory authority "to present evidence" had done so, and since the
statutory time for presenting evidence had expired. See l.C. § 19-5304(6). The State made no
presentation or argument, other than to agree with Mr. Johnson that Knight had no standing to
bring his motion. (See Tr., p.17, Ls.10-16.) Thus, but for the unauthorized filings by Knight's
attorney, there was no "presentation" to assist.
7

Contrary to the State's argument, Knight's attorney did far more than "assist" with an
untimely submission of evidence; Knight's attorney initiated the proceedings and did everything.
Knight's civil attorney moved for an order to have Mr. Johnson pay him more than $100,000
after the statutory time had expired; he filed legal briefing and affidavits and noticed-up his
motion for hearing; he also filed motions for court orders to have the Department of Correction
transport two inmates; and he argued his motion at the restitution hearing and filed supplemental
briefing. (R., pp.62, 89. 91, 106, 113, 115, 131.) The restitution was ordered exclusively on the
unauthorized filings and presentations of Knight's civil attorney. The district court's action,
which was based solely on these unauthorized proceedings, and outside of the statutory time
period requested by the State and ordered by the court, was therefore invalid and should be
voided. For this dispositive reason, the district court's order should be vacated.

5.

The Record Does Not Support Knight's Claim That A Waiver Of The Restitution
Deadline Was Reasonably Necessary

The State also takes issue with Mr. Johnson's assertion that the district court erred in
finding that a waiver of the restitution deadline was "reasonably necessary."

(Appellant's

Br., p.15; Resp. Br., p.17.) Mr. Johnson pointed out in his Appellant's Brief that two months

before the restitution period expired, the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office had charged Knight
with his own felony DUI, and that thereafter, Knight had remained in the custody of the State.
(Appellant's Br., p.15.) Mr. Johnson argued that even if the prosecutor's office had lost contact
with Knight at some point, it had obviously located Knight well within the statutory time; yet for
whatever reason, the prosecutor's office did not present the district court with a restitution
request for Knight. (Appellant's Br., p.15.)
The State takes issue with Mr. Johnson's assertion that the Canyon County Prosecutor's
Office had "located" the victim "in the sense that anyone associated him with Mr. Johnson's
8

criminal case and recognized that he was Johnson's victim." (Resp. Br., p.17.) However, and
contrary to the State's argument, the charging documents filed by the Canyon County
Prosecutor's Office in the present case clearly and conspicuously identify Clarence Knight as
Mr. Johnson's victim. (See R., pp.15, 22; PSI, pp.I 1, 23, 26.) The charging documents in
Knight's own DUI case, filed by the same prosecutor's office, obviously identified Knight; those
charging documents provided the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office with knowledge of
Knight's whereabouts and thereby provided that officer the ability and opportunity to contact and
work with Knight on restitution before the 180-day period had expired.
As argued in the Appellant's Brief, at page 14, the prosecutor, although present at the
hearing, declined to provide the district court with any reason why a further extension of time
was reasonably necessary, nor could she, given this record. The State acknowledges there is no
evidence that Knight had, at any time, ever attempted to contact or work with the prosecutor's
office on restitution - not even after his attorney began filing motions with the district court.
(Resp. Br., p.18.) For these reasons, the State's arguments should be rejected.

6.

Mr. Johnson's Appellate Arguments Regarding The Amount Of Restitution Are
Preserved And Are Properly Before This Court

The State claims that that Mr. Johnson's position in his briefing below waived his
appellate arguments regarding the amount of restitution ordered. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) The
State is incorrect.
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a.

Mr. Johnson's Position That The District Court Had Discretion - As Opposed To
Lacked Discretion - To Consider The $100,000 Insurance Payment To Knight
Does Not Preclude His Appellate Argument That The District Court Erred In Its
Exercise Of That Discretion

The Respondent's Brief plucks a fragment out of context from Mr. Johnson's district
court briefing to argue that Mr. Johnson's position below conflicts with his appellate argument.
(Resp. Br., pp.19-21.) However, reading the full statement in the context of the argument, it is
clear that Mr. Johnson's position below - that the district court had discretion, rather than lacked
it - is entirely consistent with his appellate argument that the district court erred by failing to act
consistently with the applicable legal standards that govern the district court's exercise of that
discretion.
The sentence fragment highlighted by the State, taken from Mr. Johnson's trial brief but
with the added emphasis in bold and all caps font, is "The court has discretion to consider the
insurance payment to the victim." (Resp. Br., p.20.) There exists no conflict between that
position taken in the district court, and Mr. Johnson's subsequent argument on appeal that the
district court erred in its exercise of that discretion.
The briefing referenced by the State was filed in response to the district court's request
for supplemental briefing from Mr. Johnson2 on the question of whether the $100,000 payment
from Mr. Johnson's insurer could be considered for any purpose. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.22 - p.27,
L.4.) The district court's request came after Knight's attorney had insisted that the restitution
statute prohibited the court from giving any consideration to (or from even talking about) the fact
that Knight already received the $100,000 payment. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.2-3, p.26, Ls.22 - p.27,
L.4.) Knight's supplemental brief had asserted that, based on his reading of State v. Fortin, 124
Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1993), evidence of the insurance payment is "irrelevant" and "inadmissible"

IO

and "shall not be considered in the determination of ordering restitution in a criminal case." (See
R., pp.116-17.) Mr. Johnson's brief in opposition specifically addressed Knight's assertions:
[Knight's] reading of Fortin incorrectly states that a Judge cannot take into
consideration of an insurance payment to the victim. Id. It only states that The
Judge did not abuse his discretion by deeming "proffered evidence" of an
insurance payment irrelevant in his decision to order restitution.

The Court in Fortin only states that a Judge's discretion was not abused by his
determination that proffered evidence of insurance was not relevant in that case.
And if a Court in exercising its discretion does not apply the insurance such
determination is not an abuse of discretion.
(R., pp.123-24 (emphasis original).)
Mr. Johnson's briefing is plainly directed at correcting Knight's misinterpretation of the
holding in Slate v. Fortin and Knight's misapplication of that holding to the circumstances of the
present case. Contrary to the State's characterization, Mr. Johnson's brief simply described and
attempted to distinguish the holding in the Fortin case; Mr. Johnson's brief explained that in
Fortin, the Court of Appeals had not said the trial court lacked discretion to consider insurance

proceeds, but said only that the trial court's decision not to consider the proceeds was not an
abuse of its discretion in that case. (R., pp.123-24.) Thus, in his briefing, it was Mr. Johnson's
position that the Fortin holding did not preclude the district court in this case from considering
insurance proceeds, and that contrary to Knight's assertions, the district court in this case did
have discretionary authority to consider the $100,000 already paid to Knight. (R., pp.123-24.)
Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Johnson's district court briefing did not take the
position that a refusal to grant an offset in his case would be an appropriate exercise the court's
discretion; Mr. Johnson did not take the position that Fortin meant the district court's discretion

2

No briefing was requested from or filed by the State.
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was unbridled or that there were no relevant legal standards to be applied.3 Rather, in his
briefing to the district court, Mr. Johnson argued that in accordance with legal requirements, the
insurance payment needs to be taken into account because the restitution statute strictly limits
restitution to a victim's actual out-of-pocket losses, because of the doctrine against double
recovery, because Knight signed an agreement acknowledging payment for his expenses, and
because the district court is not permitted to allocate a restitution payment to non-economic loss.

(See R., pp.124-25.)
Thus, while it is clear Mr. Johnson took the position that the district court had - rather
than lacked - discretion to consider the insurance proceeds, taking that position did not preclude
him from arguing that the district court erred when it failed to comply with relevant legal
standards governing its exercise of that discretion.

b.

Mr. Johnson's Appellate Argument - That The District Court Is To Give Effect
To The Terms Of A Settlement Agreement When Considering The Amount Of
Restitution To Order - Is Not Precluded By His Statement Below That "A
Separate Civil Settlement Does Not Bar This Court From A Separate Order For
Restitution"

Mr. Johnson argued below that the terms of Knight's signed settlement agreement, and
the $100,000 settlement payment, were "relevant" to the district court's determination of the
amount of a restitution order, in order to avoid a forbidden double recovery. (R., p.125.) As
noted by the State, within the context of his argument, Mr. Johnson also acknowledged that "a

3

It is well-settled that a trial court' s discretionary authority is multi-faceted and that an abuse of
discretion occurs unless the court: (l) correctly perceives the issue as one of discretion; (2) acts
within the boundaries of its discretion and (3) acts consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the .\pecijic choices befiJre it; and finally (4) reaches its decision by an exercise of
reason. See State v. Keys, 160 Idaho 95, 97 (Ct. App. 2016). Mr. Johnson does not argue error
under the first prong of the standard; rather, his claims of error involve the third and fourth
prongs.
12

separate civil settlement does not bar this Court from a separate order for restitution.,,4
(Resp. Br., p.25.) To the extent that Mr. Johnson's Appellant's Brief asks this Court to hold,
generally, that a civil settlement does serve to bar a separate restitution order, such argument is
precluded by his earlier statement below. However, as argued below, to the extent the settlement
agreement contains Knight's signed statement as to the facts, and represents Knight's receipt of
payment for medical expenses, the settlement agreement is "relevant"5 and must be considered
by the court in order to avoid a double recovery, and to ensure that the order compensates Knight
only for actual economic loss and not intangible harms. (See R., p.125.)
Moreover, in the event that this Court decides that civil attorneys representing client
victims may independently motion the criminal court for their own restitution orders, any prior
settlement procured by the civil attorney for the same losses should be binding on the victim to
prevent a forbidden and unwarranted double recovery. This is especially so because the civil
attorney cannot and does not represent the interests of the State, and therefore the separate and
distinct "State interest" in restitution is not advocated or protected, and the oft-cited justificati?ns

See, e.g., State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, I 14

for a separate restitution order do not exist.

(Ct. App. 2008) ("Restitution orders operate for the benefit of the state, in part because they

4

The sentence highlighted by the State provides:
While recognizing that a separate civil settlement does not bar this Court from a
separate order for restitution, the payment from insurance is relevant when a
Court is considering the amount of restitution and should respect the doctrine
against double recovery. Moon v. Brewer, 89 Idaho 59, 62-63, 402 P.2d 973, 975
(1965).

(R., p.125 (emphasis added).)
5
The district court itself highlighted the difference between the two positions, explaining, "The
civil settlement, Release, and prior insurance payments do not preclude a restitution award
outright, but they might be appropriate factors to consider in determining the amount of
restitution." (R., p.141.)
13

promote the rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the criminal law.").

As argued in the

Appellant's Brief, only the prosecuting attorney may represent the interest of the State and the
prosecuting attorney also has the duty to do justice; by contrast, a civil attorney representing a
client victim owes no such duty to the State or to do justice. (Appellant's Br., p.15.) Where, as
in this case, an overzealous civil attorney sets out to circumvent the criminal court processes by
filing first in the criminal court for payment of the victim's medical expenses, and then accepts a
settlement payment for those very losses, that agreement should be binding on the client victim.

7.

Mr. Johnson's Argument That Knight Failed To Prove An Actually-Suffered
Economic Loss Is Not Waived And Is Properly Before This Court

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Johnson argued that Knight failed to establish that his
unpaid medical bills represent losses actually suffered by Knight. (Appellant's Br., pp.24-25.)
The State asserts that Mr. Johnson's challenge is waived because he "explicitly conceded that
Mr. Knight incurred medical bills 'resulting in specific out-of-pocket economic loss' totaling
$101,665.64." (Resp. Br., p.22.) The State is incorrect. Its argument is a hybrid of supposed
verbal and written statements, comprised by cobbling snippets and partial phrases made by
Mr. Johnson in the district court; the State then represents that these created phrases amount to a
"concession" by Mr. Johnson.

(See Resp. Br., pp.21-22.)

However, an examination of the

record show, there was no such concession; Mr. Johnson did not agree or concede that Knight
had an actually suffered an economic loss in the amount of $101,665.64.
First, the State has misconstrued defense counsel's responses to the district court's
requests for the parties' stipulations that: (1) that Knight received a $100,000 payment; and (2)
Knight incurred roughly $104,000 in medical bills. (Tr., p.23, L.13 - p.25, L.6.) The State
mistakenly asserts that defense counsel's statement, "we have a pretty good record of it" referred
to Knight's medical bills.

(Resp. Br., p.21.)
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However, as the colloquy demonstrates,

Mr. Johnson's defense counsel had no record of most of Knight's medical bills, and that
Knight's civil attorney, Jeffery McKinnie had only just handed him the bulk of those bills,
totaling some $68,000. (See Tr., p.25, L.6.) Rather, Mr. Johnson's response - "we have a pretty
good record of it" - is clearly a reference to defense counsel's previous statement, "my Client's
family brought in a letter from Mr. McKinnie's office with the offer for 100,000," made in
response to the court's request for a stipulation on the receipt of the $100,000 payment. (See
Tr., p.23, L.13.)
The relevant colloquy is as follows:
COURT:

All right So would the parties stipulate that he got JOO
grandfrom the defendant's insurance company?

DEFENSE:

Well. Actually, my Client's family brought in a letter from
Mr. McKinnie 's office with the offer for 100,000.

COURT:

Okay. Stip that a hundred grand was paid to the defendant.

MR. MCKINNIE:

From insurance proceeds.

COURT:

From insurance proceeds. Would the parties stip that there
was 100 grand in medical bills? l 04 grand?

DEFENSE:

I think we have a pretty good record of it.

COURT:

Reasonably incurred medical bills.

MR. MCKINNIE:

Yes.

DEFENSE:

Well, the 68,000, Judge, I just got handed to me. I'd like
to--

COURT:

I' 11 give you time.

DEFENSE:

Okay.

(Tr., p.23, L.13 -p.25, L.6 (emphasis added).)
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Moreover, while this exchange shows that Knight's civil attorney, Mr. McKinnie,
asserted that the medical bills were reasonably incurred, it reflects no such agreement by
Mr. Johnson's defense attorney.
The State has also pulled a snippet from Mr. Johnson's trial court brief, specifically, from
the briefs overview of the facts, not the Argument section. (See Resp. Br., pp.21-22) (quoting
R., p.122). Contrary to the State's assertion, the briefs review is not Mr. Johnson's "argument"
nor his "position taken," nor is it a response to any question asked by the district court.
Moreover, contrary to the State's assertion, the brief contains no statement agreeing that Knight
reasonably incurred medical expenses in the amount of his claim. (See generally R., pp.21-25.)
Rather, and as argued in the Appellant's Brief, at page 24, the district court was incorrect
when it stated there was "no dispute that Knight had incurred these economic damages."
(R., p.141.) Contrary to the district court's misunderstanding, at no point in these proceedings
did Mr. Johnson agree that the victim had actually suffered an economic loss in the amount
shown by his medical bills.

(See generally R.; Tr., p.16, L.l - p.28, L.13.) Mr. Johnson had

stated only that he found no basis for challenging "the legitimacy of the additional medical bills"
and he acknowledged "a claim of $101,665.64 dollars out-of-pocket loss"; however, he did not
concede that the claim was valid. (R., p.123 (emphasis added).) Rather, whether the evidence
established Knight "actually suffered" an economic loss in that amount remained central and
disputed issue in these proceedings.
For the reasons argued in the Appellant's Brief, any restitution obligation that
Mr. Johnson may have owed to Knight must be offset by the $ I 00,000 already paid to Knight.
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8.

The District Court's Refusal To Offset Cannot Be Justified As Criminal
Punishment

The State's argument that a double payment is justified as furthering purposes of
punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence (Resp. Br., p.29), is contrary to the current Idaho
Supreme Court's statements that victim restitution is compensatory and must be awarded only
for actual economic loss proved, see State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013), and the Court of
Appeals' holding that criminal restitution is compensatory and not punitive, thus avoiding
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, see State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho
387 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals' cases cited by the State (Resp. Br., p.29), predate
the current version of the statute and have been superseded by the appellate courts' subsequent
pronouncements that the victim restitution statute is intended to compensate crime victims for
economic loss established, and that the current statute is not intended to be punitive.

9.

The Record Shows The $100,000 Payment To Settle Knight's Claim Was For
Medical Expenses; The Record Contains No Substantial Evidence To Justify A
Reallocation Of That Payment As Compensation For Pain And Suffering

The State argues that the $100,000 payment to Knight in this case was properly
disregarded by the district court because Mr. Johnson did not prove that this $100,000 payment
was for medical expenses rather than compensation for intangible harms, such as pain and
suffering. (Resp. Br., p.31-32.) This argument fails for several reasons.
First, the district court made no finding that any amount of this $100,000 payment was
compensation for any non-economic loss Knight may have suffered. Nor could the district court
have made such a determination on this record. Moreover, Mr. Johnson did not bear the burden
of proving the amount of Knight's actual economic loss suffered; the State bore that burden. See

Straub, 153 Idaho at 887. To the extent Mr. Johnson had a burden to show that the $100,000
17

payment was payment for Knight's medical expenses, Knight's signed and notarized statement
acknowledging payment for those expenses satisfied that burden. (See R., pp.127-30.)
Knight had submitted a "claim" of $101, 665.64 in bills showing he incurred medical
expenses, but the district court also accepted proof that Knight received a payment in the amount
of $100,000 from Mr. Johnson's insurance carrier, and that in exchange, Knight agreed to
indemnify Mr. Johnson and to hold him harmless against any "subrogation claims, medical liens,
Medicare or Medicaid" claims." (R., 127.) Thus, to the extent Knight proved he had at one time
incurred the medical expenses that he claimed, by the time of the hearing, the evidence showed
that Knight already had been paid $100,000, for a remaining unpaid loss amount of just
$1,665.64. If Knight is entitled to an order of restitution against Mr. Johnson, this is the amount
the district court should have ordered.
The State asserts the district court was required to "determine whether and how much of
the insurance payment was to compensate Mr. Knight for harms" other than economic ones.
(Resp. Br., p.32 (emphasis original).)

No Idaho appellate court has ever held as much.

Moreover, and as argued above, the only loss amounts for which Knight presented any evidence
is the $IOI ,665.64 medical expenses. There was no allocation of losses for the district court to
make. Contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Johnson is not the party in the "best position" to
know or to prove whether Knight had other non-economic losses, and as such, Mr. Johnson is

not the party with the "strongest incentive" to establish and recover such losses. That burden
should rest with Knight, the claimant, and the only person in possession of those facts. However,
Knight did not testify or offer any other substantial evidence from which the district court could
make such determinations. Assuming an allocation is permitted in Idaho, the district court did
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not make one, nor did the record contain substantial evidence upon which such an allocation
could be made.
On the contrary, virtually all of the evidence shows that Mr. Johnson's insurance
payment was intended to compensate Knight for his medical expenses. At sentencing,6
Mr. Johnson told the district court that when the restitution came up he would be able to cover it
substantially because he had insurance. (Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.2.) The prosecutor likewise told
the court that the State was aware Knight was still undergoing medical procedures it needed
additional time to look into Mr. Johnson's insurance. (Tr., p.5, Ls.11-18.) Critically, in Knight's
later motion for restitution, Knight told the district court he was attempting to negotiate with his
medical providers to resolve his "outstanding medical bills"; that Mr. Johnson's insurance
carrier, Farm Bureau, had been "refusing to cooperate in this process forming the basis for this
motion." (R., p.63.) Knight's motion further threatened that, because of Farm Bureau's "refusal
to cooperate in this case," a civil lawsuit could soon be filed. (R., p.63.)7 After filing that
motion in this case, Knight received the $ l 00,000 payment from Farm Bureau and he signed and
had notarized a statement that this payment settled all claims, including medical expenses. That

6

Even at the time of Mr. Johnson's arrest, the State was aware Mr. Johnson carried an auto
liability insurance, as evidenced by the initial police report contained within the PSI. (PSI,
pp.37-41.)
7
Knight's motion states,
Currently, the victim is attempting to negotiate with the treating providers and
interested insurance companies in order to resolve the outstanding medical bills.
See Attached Exhibit #5, Allegiance Insurance Company. However, the drunk
driver's insurance company, Farm Bureau, is refusing to cooperate in this process,
partly forming the basis of this motion. See Attached Exhibit 6, email
communication from drunk driver's insurer. A result of Farm Bureau 's refusal to
cooperate in this case, a formal lawsuit has been drafted and is expected to be
filed by March 16, 2018.

(R., p.63 (emphasis added).)
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the $100,000 payment was to compensate Knight for his medical expenses is further established
by the fact that, in exchange for that payment, Knight promised to hold harmless and indemnify
Mr. Johnson against any "subrogation claims, medical liens, Medicare or Medicaid claims."
(R., p.127.)
The State's other arguments are unremarkable and Mr. Johnson refers this Court to his
arguments in the Appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Johnson respectfully
requests that the order for restitution be vacated. Should this Court determine that the district
court had the authority to order restitution, and that the evidence shows Knight actually
suffered an economic loss, Mr. Johnson asks that the case be remanded to the district court for a
re-determination of the amount ofrestitution be ordered.
DATED this 27th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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